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ABSTRACT
What is the nature of the industrial organization of the market for physician services? Is
the market "competitive?" Are there pareto-relevant market failures, such that there is room for
welfare improving policies? Economists have devoted a great deal of attention to this market,
but it remains relatively poorly understood.
Some background on early studies of this market is presented. The nature of the product
being bought and sold, and of demand, are then characterized, in order to establish the character
of this market The key features of this market are that the product being sold is a professional
service, and the pervasive presence of insurance for consumers. A professional service is
inherently heterogeneous, non-retradable, and subject to an asymmetry of information between
buyers and sellers. These characteristics are what bestow market power on sellers, further
strengthened by the fact that consumers face only a small fraction of the price of any service due
to insurance. The implications of this for agency relationships between patients and physicians,
and insurers (both private and public) and physicians are then discussed. Agency relationships
within physician firms are also considered. Both theoretical and empirical modelling of
contracting between insurers and physicians and of the joint agency problems between patient
and physician and insurer and physician are recommended as areas for future research. Since
failures in this market are seen to derive largely from the structure of information, the potential
gains from government intervention may be sharply circumscribed.
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and NBER1. Introduction
What is the nature of the industrial organization of the market for physician services?
Is the market "competitive?" Are there pareto relevant market failures, such that there is room
for welfare improving policies? As the Clinton Administration's health care reform proposal
comes before Congress, it is widely believed that markets for health care have failed. The
market for physician services is no exception.Physicians are widely perceived to earn
"excessive' incomes and to be guilty of inducing demand, engaging in unnecessary surgery and
pursuing practice styles which may not be to the benefit of their patients. Proponents of health
care reform propose schemes in which the market for physician services would be heavily
regulated, or "managed."
In 1990, expenditures on health care totaled 666.2 billion dollars, or 12.2 percent of
gross national product, amounting to 2,566 dollars per capita. Of this, 125.7billion dollars
were spent on physician services, accounting for 2.3 percent of GNP, or 19 percent of the health
care total. Further, these expenditures have been growing. In 1970, 45.8 billion were spent on
physician services, and in 1980, physician expenditures were 66.5 billion dollars,' representing
a growth of almost 175 percent over the last twenty years. Clearly this is a quantitatively
important market in the economy. In addition, it is of intense current policy interest. AsI
intend to make clear in the rest of this paper, I also believe it is an extremely interesting and
fertile market for research in industrial organization.
The study of the physician services market is not new. Our intellectual progenitor, Adam
Smith, wrote on the importance of reputation for physicians,
1"A physician 's character is injured when we endeavor to persuade the world he kills his patients
instead of curing them, for by such a report he loses his business. "(1978, p. 399, italics added).
Smith also concerned himself with entry into the market. Scottish universities were allowed to
grant medical degrees without any restriction, and some of them were in the practice of selling
the degrees. It had been proposed that medical degrees only be granted after two years of study
at a university and a personal examination. Smith stated that restrictions on the sale of medical
degrees by Scottish universities were unnecessary because the demand for physicians' services
was a function of their professional reputations, not simply their titles,
"...That Doctors are sometimes fools as well as other people, is not, in the present times, one
of those profound secrets which is known only to the learned. ..." (Mossnerand Ross, p. 175,
italics added).
Smith also claimed that restricting the granting of degrees would create monopoly rents for the
graduates of the large prestigious universities at the expense of public welfare,
"Had the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge been able to maintain themselves in the
exclusive privilege of graduating all the doctors who could practice in England, the price of
feeling a pulse might by this time have risen from two and three guineas.., to double or triple
that sum; and English physicians might, and probably would have been at the same time the most
ignorant and quackish in the world." (Mossner and Ross, p. 178, italics added).
Nonetheless, physician services and medical care have changed a great deal since Smith's
day. Modern economists have devoted a great deal of attention to this market, but it remains
relatively poorly understood. In part, this has to do with the nature of the product which is
bought and sold, and in part with some institutional peculiarities specific to health care. As I
will argue, a crucial feature of this market is that an important product is information, and
markets for information are not extremely well understood. In addition, the pervasive nature
of insurance, such that the consumer pays for a relatively.small fraction of the cost ofany
2service he chooses, plays an extremely important role. At the same time, the nature of the
market has evolved, to the point where current issues about its industrial organization differ quite
dramatically from those of even ten years ago, specifically the rise of health plans and provider
networks.
In what follows I present some background on early studies of this market, which were
largely traditional 10 studies of monopoly power. I then characterize the nature of what is being
bought and sold, and of demand, in order to establish the special character of this market. I
argue that market failure in this market is due not to the usual culprit of anticompetitive behavior
by suppliers, but rather due to the asymmetry of information between consumers and producers.
This leads naturally to the single issue to which health economists have devoted the most effort
over the past fifteen years: induced demand. I then indicate what I see as the most important
and interesting current issue in the industrial organization of this market: contracting between
health plans and providers, and contracting within provider groups, and discuss some directions
studies of this could take. In conclusion I discuss where research on the industrial organization
of this market might go, and where efforts are needed in theoretical development, data collection
and empirical work. I also speculate on some of the policy issues, and come to the usual
conclusion of the dismal scientist: there is less scope for welfare improvement than politicians,
the media, or the public (at least as reported by the media) think. Nonetheless, some of the
developments in contracting bear watching, and careful attention to the newinstitutions in this
market could bear some fruit.
32. Background: Trends in Physician Supply and Incomes
Before proceeding to a review of the issues introduced in the previous section, it will be
helpful to present some statistics describing physician supply and incomes. Table 1 contains
figures describing the physician stock and the number of physicians per capita for the period
1965-1992. Physicians employed by the Federal government and those not involved in patient
care are excluded, since what is relevant is the stock of physicians available to supply services
to the market. Figure 1 illustrates the trend for total physicians and Figure 2 for physicians per
capita. There was very little growth in the physician stock or the number of physicians per
capita prior to 1970, the growth rate picked up in 1970, increased again in 1975, and has grown
steadily since, with the result that the total stock of physicians more than doubled between 1970
and 1992, and the physician population ratio has increased by 63 percent. Much of the early
literature on the physician services market was concerned with barriers to entry into the medical
profession. While these numbers are consistent with the possibility of barriers prior to 1970,
if barriers existed after 1970 they could not have been extremely effective.
Table 2 documents the numbers of physicians and physicians per capita for the 20 largest
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the U.S. in 1988. There are thousands or tens of
thousand of physicians in these urban areas. Clearly these are very unconcentrated markets.
Table 3 contains statistics on trends in the numbers of physicians and physiciansper capita in
urban areas with populations over 1 million. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the total number of
physicians and physicians per capita in large urban areas (population ￿ 1 million) from 1958-
1988. Figure 5 illustrates the growth rate in physicians per capita in these cities. The numbers
are large and growing over the entire period. This is consistent with these being unconcentrated
4markets which have become even less concentrated over time.
Table 4 contains information on medical school applications and admissions ratios and
Table 5 contains information on the number of medical schools, enrollment, and graduates.
Figures 5,6,and 7 illustrate the trends in the application/admission ratio, number of medical
schools, and number of graduates. The number of applicants and applications has fluctuated,
rather than growing steadily.It is especially interesting to examine the variation in the
application to admission ratio over time. The application to admission ratio peaked at a high
of 2.83 in 1973-74, then fell steadily to a low of 1.56 in 1988-89. It began rising again
thereafter. Thus, up through 1988-89, it was becoming easier to get into medical school, rather
than harder. Table 5showsthat the number of medical schools, enrollments, and graduates have
grown from 1970-71 to 1992-93. This information on medical education does not seem to point
to significant attempts to restrict entry into the medical profession.
Table 6 contains information on physician average annual net income over the period
1973 to 1991. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the trend and growth rate of physician income.
Physician income fell, although not steadily, from 1973 until 1983. It grew steadily until 1990,
and then fell again in 1991. Trends in the physician stock or number of physicians per capita
do not appear to explain the pattern of growth in physician income. The number of physicians
and the number per capita did grow much more rapidly from 1973 to 1983 than previously, but
the growth in both the physician stock and in their numbers per capita continued nearly unabated
from 1983 to 1990, when physician incomes were rising. The trend in the ratio of applications
to admissions to medical school clearly follows physician income, with a lag.Table 7
documents real physician income per hour of patient care activities. Figures 10 and 11 illustrate
5the trend in income per hour from 1982 to 1991, and the growth rate over that period,
respectively. Income per hour grew from 1982 to 1990 (excepting 1985), and then fell in 1991.
The annual growth in hourly income is much smaller for most years than the growth in total
income, indicating that a large part of the growth in incomes from the early 1980s was due to
increased hours.
Table 8 shows the percentage of physicians who are members of group practices. This
has been steadily growing since 1965, and stood at almost one-third in 1991. This is illustrated
in Figure 12. The growth in group practice membership was rapid from 1965 to 1975, leveled
off, and then accelerated in 1988. Table 9 shows the percentage of group practices with various
relationships to ilMOs and PPOs.2 The greatest percentage of groups have contracting
relationships with HMOs or PPOs, and the greatest growth has been in contracting, as opposed
to other types of relationships. The growth of health plans, and the extent of physician
contracting with them, constitute an important change in the institutions in this market.
3. Traditional Studies: Evidence on Attempts at Cartelization
In this section I review evidence on monopoly power in this market. Studies of this
phenomenon are of roughly two sorts: those that attempt to infer the presence of market power
by searching for evidence of monopoly rents, and those that attempt to examine the existence
of anticompetitive practices themselves. The first set of studies have by and large assumed that
evidence of rents constitutes evidence of barriers to entry, although as I will discuss, monopoly
power in this market at present probably mainly derives from other sources. The second set
tries to look for evidence of anticompetitive conduct and the associated impacts: price
6discrimination, advertising bans, pricing.
3.1 Studies of Monopoly Rents: What is the Return to a Medical Education?
Early studies of the market for physician services focussed on the traditional concern of
industrial organization: the exercise of monopoly power. A number of authors expressed the
view that barriers to entry into medical practice in the form of control over medical education
and physician licensure had been erected to enhance the monopoly power of physicians
(Friedman, 1962; Kessel, 1958, 1970; Rayack, 1967). Since even the smallest markets were
very unconcentrated, the traditional approach of regressing structure on performance was not
likely to be very successful applied to this market. Consequently one way of detecting evidence
of market power is to see if physicians earn a supra-normal rate of return on the investment in
their education. The earliest study taking this approach is the well known study of professional
earnings by Friedman and Kuznets (1954). Friedman and Kuznets compared the incomes of
physicians relative to dentists from 1929-1934 and found that physicians' mean earnings were
32.5 percent greater than dentists'. Friedman and Kuznets estimated that the additional training
required by physicians could only justify a 17 percent difference, therefore they concluded that
15.5 percent of physician earnings were monopoly rents due to restriction of entry into medical
school by the American Medical Association.4
A number of other studies have taken this approach to searching for evidence of market
power in this industry (Sloan, 1970, Lindsay, 1973, Sloan, 1976; Leffler and Lindsay, 1980;
Leffler, 1978; Burstein and Cromwell, 1985). The results generally show a significant positive
return to medical education, but vary widely in magnitude according to methods used and time
7period examined. In consequence it is hard to determine if physicians earned excess returns for
the time periods examined by these studies. Further, the most recent research (Burstein and
Cromwell, 1985) examines earnings from nearly twenty years ago, thus the fmdings may bear
little relation to current reality.5 With the systematic striking down of anticompetitive practices
by the AMA and local medical societies by antitrust authorities starting in the mid 1970s, it is
hard to believe that egregious forms of collusion are currently rampant. Further, it is not clear
exactly what is being identified by these sorts of studies. It is possible that entry into the
medical profession was restricted by the AMA to below competitive levels, but this does not
necessarily imply that output markets were less than competitive. This could have simply
created excess demand for physicians, which could increase their price, i.e., the rate of return
to a medical education.6 Nonetheless, the trends in physician supply, medical school admission
rates, and physician incomes reported in Section 2 are not consistent with the existence of
effective barriers to entry. Even if entry into the medical profession is restricted, entry into
local markets is essentially free. Thus, barriers to entry into the profession cannot be viewed
as a source of market power. While I think a study of physician earnings and the return to a
medical degree using the most recent data would be fascinating and is called for, I don't view
this as the most crucial part of an agenda for research in the industrial organization of this
market. Such a study by its very nature does not identify the nature of the conduct related to
market power.
A more recent paper by Noether (1986a) tries to discern evidence on the competitiveness
of the market for physicians by examining the stock of physicians as a weighted average of the
vels predicted by a cartel model and by a perfectly competitive model. The idea is to estimate
8the weight and thus determine the competitiveness of the market. Using data covering the period
from 1948 to 1982, Noether finds that the market has grown steadily more competitive since
1965. Her estimates suggest a growth of 6 to 20 percent in the physician stock over time due
to increasing competition and a concomitant decline of 19 to 45percentin incomes. In another
paper Noether (1986b) empirically tests whether the AMA's power to control the physician stock
has eroded over time. She models the stock of physicians as consisting of a "dominant fu-m"
of AMA physicians plus a competitive fringe of foreign medical graduates (FMGs) and new
domestic graduates (USMGs). The test consists of discriminating between whether the growing
stock of physicians can be modelled as due to a shift in the supply curve of physicians or due
to a shift in demand. Noether concludes that the supply has been shifting, thus entry has
occurred through the competitive fringe. This implies that the AMA's power to control entry
has eroded over time. Neither of these papers, however, employ data from the period after
1982, when physician incomes began rising again.
3.2 The Exercise of Monopoly Power
Another set of papers studying the physician services market explicitly attempt to gauge
aspects of competition in this market. The most well known of these is the famous paper by
Kessel (1958) on price discrimination in medicine. Kessel was looking for evidence of
anticompetitive behavior, specifically for evidence the AMA was acting as a cartel. Since price
discrimination is not possible in competitive markets, any evidence of price discrimination by
physicians constitutes per se evidence of their monopoly power. Kessel claims that price
discrimination by income in the form of a sliding scale for fees is a pervasive practice in
9medicine. Kessel assumes that price discrimination cannot be maintained without cartelization.7
One of Kessel's theses is that "control over the pricing policies of doctors is directly and
immediately related to AMA control of medical education." (p.29). This is not established in
any convincing way, and indeed, seems to confuse control over entry with the actual exercise
of monopoly power.8 More appropriately, Kessel examines a number of actions of the AMA
and state and local medical societies to see if they are consistent with attempts to achieve and
maintain market power, mainly attempts to prevent price cutting. The AMA controlled hospital
certification for intern training, and advised hospitals so certified that their staff should be
comprised solely of local medical society members. Interns were (are) an important source of
cheap labor and involvement in postgraduate medical education enhanced a hospital's reputation.
Hence, the loss of this certification implied a substantial economic loss for the hospital and the
physicians practicing there.The AMA opposed prepaid health plans and supported
reimbursement insurance. Further, local medical societies could and did deny hospital admitting
privileges to physicians who participated in prepaid health plans or who engaged in competitive
practices. While Kessel does describe attempts to enforce cartel behavior, he doesn't present
systematic empirical evidence on the existence or extent of price discrimination or monopolistic
pricing.9 Consequently it is not clear how successful those attempts at cartelization were.
Regardless of the success or welfare loss resulting from such practices, the systematic
application of the antitrust laws to the medical profession which began in the mid-1970s has
struck them down, consequently cartel behavior by the AMA or medical societies is no longer
a serious concern (see Havighurst, 1980, 1983; Costillo, 1985, Lerner, 1984; and Horoschak,
1992 for reviews).'0''
10Another set of papers has examined the effects of advertising. Prior to a 1982 suit by
the Federal Trade Commission, the AMA's code of ethics forbade physician advertising)2
While I know of no direct evidence of the effect of this ban, there are a number of papers which
have examined the effects of state level advertising bans in optometry prior to 1982 and there
are two papers which have examined physician advertising and its effects post-1982. Studies of
optometry have consistently found that advertising lowers the price of optometric services
(Benham, 1972; Feldman and Begun, 1978; Kwoka, 1984; Haas-Wilson, 1986; Gaynor and
Mullahy, 1993)) This suggests the possibility that the same may have been true of the
physician advertising ban. Rizzo and Zeckhauser (1992) studied the effects of physician
advertising using post-advertising ban data from 1987 and 1988. They found that, controlling
for physician choice of whether to advertise, advertising leads to higher prices, more time per
visit, and fewer visits. Advertising seems to support market segmentation by physicians. In
another paper, Rizzo and Zeckhauser (1990), using the same data, found that advertising is a
complement to experience. This may imply that advertising could act as a barrier to entryin
this market. In any event, it is far from clear that advertising in physician markets will behave
in ways consistent with the evidence from advertising bans in optometric markets. One key
difference is that while much of advertising for optometric services is price advertising, very
little physician advertising is over price. An interesting study by Hibbard and Weeks (1989)
studied the effects of disseminating information about physician prices. In this study an
experimental group received a directory of fees charged by local physiciansfor common
procedures, and a chart indicating the range of fees for each procedure.A control group
received no such chart. At the end of the two year study no significant differences werefound
11between the two groups in the mean expense for a physician visit. Hibbard and Weeks speculate
that the cost savings to the consumers were not substantial enough to affect their patterns of
consumption.'4 Physician advertising is still relatively rare, although it has been growing
(Rizzo and Zeckhauser, 1992 indicate that the proportion of physicians who advertise is
estimated to have risen from 4 percent in 1982 to 20 percent in 1987). If consumers become
more price conscious, advertising about price has the possibility of reducing welfare (Dranove
and Satterthwaite, 1992; Holt and Sherman, 1990). If the use of advertising continues togrow
among physicians, economists will need to pay attention to its application as a strategic variable,
and the attendant normative implications.
Last, an interesting paper by McCarthy (1985) tries to assess the competitiveness of the
market by estimating the price elasticity of demand facing the physician firm. McCarthy
estimates a price elasticity of three using 1975 data. This is consistent with physicians
possessing market power, since they operate on the elastic portion of their demand curve.
Nonetheless, it indicates that the demand facing physician firms is quite elastic, which certainly
limits the extent to which they can price above marginal cost. McCarthy also found that demand
is negatively influenced by waiting time, and that the number of physicians in the market shifts
in the firms' demand curve. Both of these are also consistent with a characterization of the
market as monopolistically competitive.
3.3 What Does the Evidence Tell Us?
In summary, the evidence indicates that the AMA and local medical societiesengaged
in anticompetitive practices in the past and that these endeavors met witha certain amount of
12success. These practices have gradually been struck down by antitrust decisions, however,
starting in the 1950s and culminating in the 1970s. The evidence seems to indicate that
physicians earned monopoly rents up through the 1970s. There are no studies which use more
recent data, so we do not know what has happened since then. However, the downward trends
in physician incomes, applications to medical school, and the medical school rejection rate
through the 1980s described in Section 2 are consistent with declining returns to a medical
education. Recently however, these trends have been reversed, leading to the question of what
has changed.It does not seem plausible that collusion is very extensive.It may be that
physicians have found new means of obtaining market power in the aftermath of the elimination
of previous anticompetitive practices.'5 In the sections that follow, I will explore what I
believe to be the current sources of market power for physicians, and describe how they might
or might not have anticompetitive effects. I will also suggest what I view as useful avenues for
future research, both from the point of view of how industrial organization research can inform
our knowledge of the physician services market, but also how studying this market might
provide some empirical evidence on current issues in industrial organization.
4. Agency Problems
Agency problems exist when the preferences of two parties to an exchange do not
coincide, and one of the parties possesses more relevant information than the other (Arrow,
1985, Ross, 1973).Agency problems are so prevalent that they can be said to characterize
this market.'7 There are three sets of exchanges for which agency problems exist. First is the
exchange between the patient and the physician. The consumer does not know his true
13condition, nor the technology of producing health from health care, thus the physician has the
opportunity to recommend services which the patient would not choose if he had full
information. Quality of care (or physician effort in producing care) can be observed far less
precisely by the patient than by the physician, providing the physician with an opportunity to
skimp on quality. The same is true of diagnosis, as opposed to treatment. If the quality of
diagnosis is increasing in costly physician effort, diagnosis effort is unobservable to the patient,
and effort is costly to the physician, then an agency problem exists here as well. All of these
problems are exacerbated by the presence of insurance in this market, since consumers bear only
a small part of any pecuniary costs associated with agency problems. Indeed, these types of
agency problems exist elsewhere. The factor which distinguishes this market from others is that
consumers only pay a small fraction of the price of the service.
The second area in which agency is relevant is the exchange between the insurer and the
physician)8 This includes both private and public insurers. Since the consumer pays a small
fraction of the cost of any physician services chosen, the insurer pays the bulk of the expense
associated with any suboptimal choices made due to agency problems. Thus the insurer has an
incentive to try to provide the physician with incentives to make optimal choices. Many recent
developments in insurance seem to be efforts to do just that (e.g., managed care policies, various
forms of contracting).
The third area for agency problems in this market is within the firm. The majority of
nonfederal physicians in patient care are now members of medical group practices (Marder and
Thran, 1988).' As in any firm, agency problems abound (see e.g., the survey by Holmstrom
and Tirole, 1989). These problems differ somewhat in physician firms due to the nature of the
14production process (e.g., the important capital is human, rather than physical) and the market
(if firm reputation is important, this creates an opportunity for free-riding by individual
members) 20Theinternal structure of these firms could serve to either blunt or reinforce
incentives designed to deal with the patient-physician agency problems or physician-insurer
agency problems.
Since successful collusion between physician firms seems unlikely, market failure must
be derived from another source. As described in the following sections, the asymmetry of
information between physicians and patients and between physicians and insurers, combined with
product and preference heterogeneity, confers market power on physicians. In what follows I
will take up each of these areas in turn. I will briefly review the relevant theoretical literature,
then turn to the empirical literature. I will conclude by making some recommendations for
future research.
4.1 Physician-Patient Agency Problems
4.1.1 The Nature of the Product
Before proceeding to a discussion of what I view as the salient issues regarding physician-
patient agency it is essential to discuss the nature of what is exchanged by physiciansand
patients. The market for physician services is a market for a service, as opposed to a tangible
product. This in and of itself gives the product certain characteristics which have afundamental
impact on exchanges in the market. Moreover, I will argue that diagnosis is afundamental
aspect of the product's character and that it is crucial to understandingthe industrial organization
of this market.
15First, consider health care as a service. All services are by their nature inherently
heterogeneous. A haircut, an oil change, a will preparation, are never the same thing twice.2'
This is even more true of made to order, or customized, services, e.g., a fashion makeover,
music lessons, catering, investment advice, or representation in divorce proceedings. This
certainly applies to physician services, from those which are routine, such as check-ups, to those
which are specific to the patient (i.e., made to order, or "customized"). Further, preferences
are heterogeneous. Some patients will prefer extensive explanation and discussion of their case,
others would prefer the bare minimum. Some will prefer "Cadillac" or "gold-plated" treatment,
whereas others will only wish to pay for only that which is adequate or necessary, the "Ford"
or "Chevrolet" treatment. This may also be the case with immutable physician characteristics
(or those which cannot be changed ex post, like "putty-clay" investment, e.g., board
certification, medical school). Individuals may prefer physicians of a particular age, sex, race,
or ethnic background, or with a particular appearance (tall, short, brown hair, blue eyes,
conservatively dressed, fashionably dressed, hip, etc.). Some may prefer a general practitioner
for their primary care, while others may favor a board certified internist. Satterthwaite (1979,
1985) has stressed the idiosyncratic nature of preferences in this market.
It is this combination of a heterogeneous product with heterogeneous preferences which
is key, As Satterthwaite has argued persuasively, this bestows the seller with marketpower.
Patients choose physicians who produce the type of services and have characteristics which best
match their preferences. The fact that patients choose physicians who give them the highest
utility gives physicians market power, since switching to another physician will reduce a
patient's utility. The less substitutable are physicians for one another, the greater the degree of
16market power, i.e., the lower is the elasticity of demand a physician faces. Since the vast
majority of physicians are located in urban markets with many other physicians, the market can
be characterized as monopolistically competitive. This is a powerful paradigm which can help
to explain observed patterns in this market.
4.1.2 The Structure of Information
While I believe that this characterization is essentially correct, there are still some crucial
pieces missing from this puzzle. Let us consider the pieces which may be missing. First,
nothing has been said yet about the structure of information, and this is vitally important.
Uncertainty is an integral part of demand and supply in this market. Patients are uncertain about
their condition, the accuracy of the physician's diagnosis, his honesty, and the amount of effort
or quality he has expended on their case. They have even less information about these factors
for other physicians in the rest of the market. Physicians do not know the patient's condition,
they are uncertain about the technology of producing health from health care, and they do not
(generally) know the patient's reservation price.Second, it is also crucial to account for the
influence of third party payment. The vast bulk of physician services bought and sold in this
country are covered by insurance. This means that the consumer of the service himself pays
only a small fraction of the cost, while the majority is reimbursed by third-party payers. Third,
it is not complete to represent the product in this market as a typical service. Physicians do not
provide only medical care, or treatment, but also diagnosis and advice. Indeed, there are very
few patients who demand only care, with no diagnosis or advice. Usually a patient will demand
diagnosis and advice first, and then treatment.24In what follows these points will be
17elaborated by first considering the search for a physician and next the nature of exchange in
diagnosis and treatment.
4.1.3 The Process of Search for a Physician
To illustrate, consider the process a consumer goes through when seeking care. A
consumer first decides they want to see a physician. They may feel ill, or simply want a check-
up.I will not consider emergency, life-or-death situations, since demand in those cases is
fundamentally different. If they have an established relationship with a primary care physician
(general practitioner or internist), and are satisfied with that relationship they will make an
appointment to see that physician. If the consumer does not have an established relationship
with a primary care physician, or if they are not satisfied with their current physician, they must
search for a new one. The most common form of searching is obtaining recommendations from
relatives, friends, and colleagues.tm Regardless of the actual search mechanism, it is clear that
search is costly. In addition, many physicians charge more for initial visits, presumably to take
the patient's history and get acquainted.tm Thus there is a very clear cost associated with
switching physicians. Patients will only switch if the expected gains are at least as great as the
expected costs of switching. This has a negative effect on the elasticity of demand facing the
individual physician, and the greater the search costs, the less elastic will be demand
(Satterthwaite, 1979). Thus uncertainty over the characteristics and prices of all physicians in
the market plays a key role in determining equilibrium in this market.V
It is important at this point to note a few further factors about the search for a physician.
First, although search costs for consumers confer power over price to physicians, physicians may
18also be ignorant. Physicians are not very likely to be perfectly informed about consumers'
reservation prices.28 Gaynor and Polachek (1994) provide some empirical evidence on this.
They consider a model in which patients may pay more than a sellers reservation price due to
their ignorance and physicians may accept less than a buyers reservation price due to their
ignorance. A two-sided frontier price function is used to estimate measures of patient and
physician ignorance. Their results indicate that there is significant physician ignorance in the
market, although patient ignorance outweighs physician ignorance by roughly a factor of two.
Measured patient relative to physician ignorance is larger for services which are more heavily
insured, purchased infrequently, or associated with severe illness. Second, the presence of third
party payment for medical expenses affects the benefits of search to the consumer. If insurance
pays eighty percent of physician fees, the savings to the consumerof finding a less expensive
physician are relatively small (Newhouse, 1978).29 Dionne (1984) shows that insurance can
have a strong effect on search.3° The presence of insurance will tend to lead to greater
dispersion in prices. This may lead consumers to search less, or more, in equilibrium. It is
possible that consumers may search more because the increased dispersionin the price
distribution means that there is a bigger potential payoff to search, since the expected gap
between the current price and the lowest price is larger.l'hird, and most importantly,
consumers are concerned about not only price, but quality. Consequently any decision toswitch
will be based on information about both of those. Insurance leads to quality being thesalient
factor, since consumers bear very little of the expense. Dranove andSatterthwaite (1992)
examine equilibrium in such a market. In this case, search may focus entirely on quality.
Search over quality is arguably more costly than search over price, however. Physicianservices
19are arguably what Satterthwaite (1979) calls a reputation good, or what Darby and Karni (1972)
call a credence good. The implication is that the demand facing a physician firm may be
relatively inelastic, due to the combination of price being covered by insurance, and the
costliness of searching over quality.3'
4.1.4 Diagnosis and Treatment
Now consider the next step in seeking care. The consumer has chosen a physician. The
patient sees the physician and describes his symptoms. The physician asks some questions. He
may do a physical examination or recommend some tests. The physician then makes a diagnosis
and recommends a course of action. The action may be to do nothing, it may be to prescribe
some medication, it may be to return for another exam after a specified period of time, it may
be to undertake further diagnostic testing, it may be to undertake a procedure, or it may be a
referral to a specialist. The patient weighs the expected costs versus the expected benefits of
the recommendation and accepts the recommendation, rejects it and does nothing, or seeks
another opinion (and diagnosis). I would first like to consider what is being exchanged in this
transaction, and then to discuss the structure of information. Last, I want to discuss the role of
insurance, the market, and repetition in the relationship between buyer and seller.
4.1.4.1 The Product
What is being bought and sold primarily is information. The physician is hired to make
a diagnosis and provide advice on the appropriate course(s) of action. This in and of itself is
not unique to health care markets. Repair services generally have this characteristic. An auto
20mechanic diagnoses a car problem and provides a recommendation for action. Appliance
repairmen operate in the same way. Stockbrokers or financial advisers diagnose an individual's
financial situation and advise them on investment strategies and on particular investments. Taxi
drivers are told the destination of the passenger and allowedirequested to choose the route. The
purchase of such services has been analyzed under the literature known as "games of
persuasion. "32
4.1.4.2The Structure of Information in Diagnosis and Treatment
Such games have the following information structure. The consumer observes a symptom
(engine knocking, pain in the side). The consumer observes only the symptom, but does not
know the nature of the problem. There is some probability, known to all, that the problem is
a serious problem, with an expensive treatment/repair and some probability it is minor
(inexpensive treatment). The expert can observe (let's say with certainty) whether the problem
is serious or minor, and can perform both the expensive and the inexpensive treatments.33 The
consumer prefers the appropriate treatment/repair, but cannot observe the problem. There is an
asymmetry of information between the buyer and seller, and thus an agency relationship. This
creates the possibility for the seller to misrepresent the nature of the consumer's problem to him.
An incentive to do so exists when the more expensive repair is also more profitable. What
limits this sort of behavior? The most complete analysis is in Wolinsky (1993). Wolinsky
shows that in equilibrium, consumer search will act as a constraint on the opportunistic behavior
of sellers. One of the equilibria, which he finds to be more likely, is one in which sellers
specialize in repairing serious or minor problems, and price at their respective marginal costs.
21Another equilibrium is one in which there is fraud, which is limited by the incentive for
consumers to search. In the health care setting, insurance limits consumer benefits to search,
consequently the fraud equilibrium may be likely. I know of no papers on the physician services
market which have explicitly analyzed this phenomenon. The closest are Pauly (1980), Dranove
(1988), Glazer and McGuire (1991), and Frank, Ma, McGuire, and Salkever (1993).
4.1.4.3TheoreticalModels
A very large part of the literature in health economics is on this topic, which has been
dubbed "induced demand" or "demand creation. "'Thisnotion is often traced to Roemer
(1961), who observed a positive correlation between the number of hospital beds per 1,000
population and the number of hospital days per 1,000 population. Roemer posited that supply
creates its own demand. One of the earlier theoretical papers is by Evans (1974), in which he
speculated that physicians had a "target income," and would induce demand if a shock reduced
their earnings below that level." The amount of inducement was limited by professional
disutility, or "ethics,' associated with inducement activities. In what follows I review the
papers in this literature which have explicitly considered the agency relationship between
physician and patient.37 In particular, I focus on games of persuasion.
Pauly (1980) explicitly analyzes the physician-patient relationship as an agency
relationship. Physicians supply diagnostic information to patients, and choose the accuracy of
the information. Patients are less informed, although they can use previous experience to help
them estimate the accuracy of the physician's diagnosis. Physicians may choose to provide less
than perfectly accurate diagnoses, even if patients know that physicians engage in this behavior.
22This is similar in spirit to Darby and Karni (1972), where fraud exists in equilibrium due to the
costs to consumers of obtaining infonnation. Pauly briefly discusses market equilibrium (Model
2 in Chapter 4), but does not really analyze it.
Dranove (1988) examines how the market can act as a constraint on physicians' behavior.
Physicians and patients play a two-stage game. Physicians can recommend treatments for which
the costs outweigh the benefits. Their recommendations, conditioned on exogenous factors,
constitute their recommendation strategy. Dranove points out that this can be thought of as a
reputation. Patients use the physician's recommendation combined with their beliefs about the
physician's recommendation strategy to make an inference about the seriousness of their illness.
They are more likely to consent to a physician's recommendation who has a reputation for
honesty than one who has a reputation for inducement. Physicians know patients' decision rules,
and choose their recommendation strategy using those decision rules as a constraint. Physicians
choose the amount of inducement which just balances increased revenues from improperly
advised treatments with revenues lost from the (negative) impact on reputation. Again, this has
the same flavor as Darby and Karm, in that there is an optimal amount of "fraud" in
equilibrium. The physician is assumed to be a monopolist, however, so issues associated with
market equilibrium are not dealt with explicit1y?
Rochaix (1989) explicitly considers patient search among physicians as a constraint on
physician behavior. The paper shows, via simulation, that there exist distributions of accuracy
in equilibrium. She finds that it only takes a relatively small number of informed patients to
force physicians to act as better agents in equilibrium.
Wolinsky (1993) is a recent paper on markets for experts' diagnostic and treatment
23services which explicitly models equilibrium in the market.39 This is the only paper on games
of persuasion of which I am aware which specifically considers market equilibrium. In this
model customer search and reputation concerns serve to discipline experts' incentives to engage
in opportunistic behavior. Consumers have problems which can be treated with a major or a
minor treatment. Consumers do not know which type of problem they have, but experts can
diagnose it. Major treatments are more profitable, thus the asymmetry of information creates
an opportunity for opportunistic behavior by experts. Consumers can search by obtaining
multiple diagnoses, but diagnoses are costly. Wolinsky first considers a model without
reputations. There are multiple equilibria in this market. In one of the equilibria, if
searchldiagnosis costs are not too high, experts specialize and price at marginal cost.
Consumers start searching at a minor treatment expert. If rejected they go to a major treatment
expert. Minor treatment experts have no incentive to diagnose dishonestly as major treatments,
since they lose this business. Competition will drive the prices of both types of experts to
marginal cost. In this equilibrium the diagnosis and treatment of major problems is separated,
since minor treatment experts diagnose all problems first. This bears a resemblance to some
proposals (see Dranove, 1988) that separating diagnosis and treatment is a solution to the
inducement or overprescribing problem. We certainly see some of this in this market, since
there is a separation between generalists and specialists. For example, patients typically see a
GP or internist for diagnosis first, and are then referred to a specialist. Completely separating
diagnosis and treatment probably doesn't occur because of economies of scope in the production
of these services. There are also economies to the patient in terms of time costs. Another
equilibrium is one in which there is an optimal amount of fraud, a la Darby and Karni. This
24requires a certain markup of price over marginal cost to be sustained as an equilibrium.
Wolinsky indicates that this will not be an equilibrium if there are sufficiently many experts in
themarket, since the markup will elicit price cutting. It is not entirely clear this will hold true
in the market for physician services, since consumer demand is so price inelastic due to
insurance coverage.
In the model with reputation consumers live two periods (there are overlapping
generations, but this does not play a central role). Experts have reputation concerns since there
is the possibility of repeat business from consumers. Consumers have beliefs about experts'
strategies, which are updated in the second period based on their first period experience.
Reputation is patient-specific, rather than marketwide. In this sense the model is similar to
Pauly (1980) and Dranove (1988). Wolinsky, however, also considers the possibility of search
by consumers. He indicates that if search costs are low enough, the search equilibrium
described previously will dominate the reputation equilibrium. The opposite is true if search
costs are high. He also points out that there may be an equilibrium with both search and
reputation, since consumers are heterogeneous in their search costs, and different kinds of
problems will vary in their diagnosis costs.
These papers all have the common theme of examining the extent to which consumer
information can act as a check on physicians' opportunistic behavior. One approach which has
not been explored insofar as I am aware is considering dynamic aspects of physician-patient
relationships. Repetition can limit the scope for opportunistic behavior in agency relationships.
Wolinsky's model of reputation considers this, but expanding this could yield someuseful
insights. Specifically, incorporating information transmission among consumers suchthat there
25is a marketwide reputation could be important. One possibility is to consider information
transmission across overlapping generations. If the old, with experience, transmit information
to the young, this could have dramatic effects on equilibrium and efficiency. Salant (1991) has
shown generally that in this kind of game second-best equilibria exist which are improvements
on the noncooperative outcome.
4.1.4.4EmpiricalEvidence
There is a vast empirical literature on induced demand in physician markets. See Sloan
and Feldman (1978), Feldman and Sloan (1988), Dranove and Wehner (1993) for summaries.
Most of these studies use cross-sectional data to examine the relationship between the number
of physicians per capita in an area and either price or quantity. The notion is that entry should
reduce equilibrium price or quantity if the market is competitive, whereas evidence of a positive
relation between the number of physicians per capita and price or quantity per physician
constitutes evidence of induced demand. As Reinhardt (1978) points out, just about any pattern
is consistent with demand inducement, rendering this hypothesis non-falsifiable by these sorts
of data. In addition, there are serious econometric problems with most of these studies, as
pointed out by Feldman and Sloan (1988). A number of other authors have pointed out that
there are other models which predict the same patterns in the data. Entry could lead to
increased non-price competition, which could increase price and quantity. It could also decrease
consumers' travel and waiting times, which could lead to a higher equilibrium price and
quantity. Entry could increase the cost of acquiring information, which would make switching
physicians less likely and this could increase price. Last, probably the most damning criticism
26is to show that this approach produces empirical results consistent with the inducement
hypothesis where inducement is impossible. Dranove and Wehner (1993) do just this. They
examine the demand for childbirths using the methodology standard to most studies of induced
demand and find evidence consistent with it.Presumably, most physicians find it rather
difficult, if not impossible, to induce demand for childbirths!
Rather than re-summarize this literature, I would like to consider what would constitute
evidence of opportunistic or fraudulent behavior with regard to physicians' diagnosis and
treatment decisions. There are two issues: what sorts of data would allow for valid tests, and
what are some refutable hypotheses? Clearly, micro level data on physician-patient interactions
is necessary in order to identify any inducement effects. What are some testable hypotheses?
One obvious counterfactual is to consider the choices of well-informed consumers and compare
them against those of less well-informed consumers. Hay and Leahy (1982) compared the
quantity of care received by doctors and their families with that received by the rest of the
population, controlling for other relevant factors. Presumably physicians and their families are
well-informed, and opportunism is more difficult with them. Hay and Leahy found that doctors
and their families received more care than others, rather than less. Kenkel (1990) uses survey
responses about patient knowledge of the meaning of symptoms as a measure of patient
information. He then estimates the demand for medical care, allowing information to be
endogenous. Information increases the probability than medical care is utilized, but has no
impact on the quantity demanded conditional on there being any utilization. The results also
suggest that poorly informed patients underestimate the productivity of medical carein treating
illness. Thus, if anything, it seems as if physicians may "iheable to persuade consumers to
27use enough medical care, rather than inducing excessive consumption.
Dranove (1988) suggests that a test would be to examine the patterns of patient
compliance with physician recommendations. Compliance rates should be lower when the
condition is not acute, patients are more informed (educated), the benefits of treatment are
lower, and the costs of treatment borne by the patient are higher (this includes the non-insured
pecuniary costs, plus time costs, physical discomfort, and the riskiness of the treatment). The
work by Rossiter and Wilensky (1983) provides some evidence on this. Rossiter and Wilensky
examined the difference between patient-initiated visits and other visits. Presumably patient-
initiated visits are not subject to physician advice. They found some evidence consistent with
a very small inducement effect for non-patient initiated visits, and nothing for patient-initiated
visits.
Further, incentives in the form of physician compensation should matter. Physicians who
are salaried, or paid on a capitation basis (a fixed rate per patient, rather than per service),
should have no incentive to engage in opportunistic behavior, unless the change in their
compensation over time is somehow linked to providing more or moie costly services. There
is no question that physicians paid on an incentive basis produce a higher quantity (Gaynor and
Pauly, 1990; Gaynor and Gertler, 1993) and charge higher prices (Gaynor, 1989). However,
it is not clear that this constitutes evidence of overprescribing behavior. Physicians whose
compensation is not based on incentives may be shirking, or there may be a combination of
shirking by physicians on fixed compensation and opportunistic behavior by those on incentive
compensation. There is some evidence consistent with this from a randomized controlled trial
from a hospital clinic (Hickson, Altmeier, and Perrin, 1987). Half of the clinic doctors were
28randomly selected to be paid on a fee-for-service basis, and half were paid a fixed salary.
Patients were randomized among the doctors. The fee-for-service physicians saw more patients
and exceeded guidelines for pediatric care. The salaried physicians were in less conformity with
guidelines for pediatric care than those paid by salary. This suggests that the fee-for-service
doctors may have been engaging in overprescribing, while the salaried doctors may have been
shirking.
4.1.4.5 What Do We Know About Opportunistic Diagnosis and Advice by Physicians?
In spite of the large literature in health economics on this topic, I would suggest that we
know relatively little, in a quantitative sense, about this behavior. There is some evidence
consistent with some overprescribing by physicians, but by and large the studies do not use the
right data or look at the kinds of behavior which would allow testing of this hypothesis. AsI
indicated previously, I believe that micro data on physician-patient interactions are really
necessary to sort this out. While there are no such data sets amongthose commonly used by
economists, it may still be possible to examine this behavior. There is a body of research which
examines physician-patient interactions done by physicians, anthropologists, sociologists, and
communications researchers. There very well may be extant data sets gathered for these sorts
of studies which would shed some light on the problem. Alternatively, it also may be possible
for economists to collaborate on such studies and design data collection activities whichwould
make it possible to test hypotheses. Perhaps most importantly, further work on the theoryof
games of persuasion, with an eye toward the institutionsin this particular market, could generate
hypotheses which would allow us to test for the existence and importanceof opportunistic
29diagnosis and advice by physicians.
4.2 Physician-Insurer Agency Problems
As I mentioned previously, the major factor which seems to separate the market for
physician services from other markets for experts' services is the presence of third-party
insurance, both private and public.40 In spite of the importance of insurance coverage in this
market, many of the papers which model the physician-patient agency problem do not consider
the impact of insurance. Insurance effects the physician-patient agency relationship through its
effect on consumer demand. This weakens patients' incentives to constrain physicians'
opportunistic behavior. Physicians may provide services to patients for which the patients'
private costs are less than the patients' benefits, but for which the total of their costs and
insurers' costs exceed the benefits.4L Consequently, services provided which fit this description
are simply another form of moral hazard. Insurers have attempted to limit this behavior by
patient cost-sharing. However, increases in patient cost-sharing also increase the risk they bear.
Taking this as given, there is an agency relationship between the insurer and the physician. The
question here is whether there is some scope for insurers to improve matters, and if so, what
the optimal contract(s) might look like. Many papers have considered physician response to the
form of the compensation contract, generally focusing on fee-for-service versus capitation
reimbursement (see Newhouse, 1992 and Ellis and McGuire, 1993 for reviews).42 Some
papers which have considered this problem with a single insurer are Ellis and McGuire (1990),
Selden (1990), and Blomqvist (1991).
Ellis and McGuire (1990) consider a model of bargaining between patient and physician.
30There is no asymmetric information between the patient and physician, although physicians are
modeled as patients' agents by placing a weight on the patient's preferences a part of their own
utility. Patient-physician pairs are assumed fixed, so market equilibrium is not considered. The
major finding is that an optimal payment for health care will lead to conflict between patient and
physician. Insurance for the patient carries with it moral hazard. The optimal payment for the
physician will lead him to provide less than the patient's insured demand, hence the conflict.
They also find that supply-side policies are optimal for controlling costs and that cost-based
reimbursement to providers is never optimal.
Selden (1990) derives the third party payer's optimal provider reimbursement where
treatment may be influenced by the provider. The optimal payment system is a mix of cap itation
(per-patient fixed payment) and cost-based reimbursement. Here also there is no explicit
modeling of the patient-physician agency relationship nor of the insurer-physician agency
relationship. The agency problem which is modeled is between insurer and patient. Quantity
is determined by a function which has the patient's and physician's objective functions as
arguments. There is no treatment of equilibrium in any of the markets.
Blomqvist (1991) considers a problem in which the patient knows whether they are ill
or not, but they do not know the exact nature of the illness. Physicians can observe the exact
nature of the illness, and insurers cannot even observe if the patient is actually ill. Under a fee-
for-service payment contract from the insurer, the physician will always have an incentive to
supply too much. If patients pay only a small fraction of the cost, they do not necessarily act
as a sufficient check on this behavior. There is a welfare loss due to this opportunistic behavior
which is essentially a welfare loss due to moral hazard. If physicians would reveal the true
31nature of the patients' illness to the insurer, then it would be possible to write contingent
contracts against the state of health (e.g., these could take the form of indemnity insurance in
which the insured is paid a prespecified dollar amount for each state of nature). However, these
first-best contracts are not possible, since patients and physicians always have an incentive to
misrepresent the patient's state of health as worse than it truly is. Blomqvist assumes that HMO
type contracts in which doctors are employees of the insurer solve the physician-insurer agency
problem, but the patient-physician problem remains. However, physician behavior is not
explicitly modeled nor is it shown that the strategies analyzed are a best response.
These papers all focus on optimal payment methods for health providers. They do not,
however, explicitly model agency problems between the insurer and physician nor between the
patient and physician. Neither do they consider market equilibrium.
Certainly other theoretical approaches to this problem should yield important insights.
It is important to emphasize the problem of asymmetric information in contracting. The optimal
contracting literature (Hart and Holmstrom, 1987) suggests it should be possible for insurers to
write better contracts with physicians than pure reimbursement insurance. This agency approach
applies both to private and public insurers. The vast bulk of papers which consider optimal
public payments to health care providers do so under conditions of certainty. Some very
important insights have been obtained with this approach, but it is important to remember that
public payers face the same problems of asymmetric information as do private payers. The next
step is considering public payment as an agency relationship between regulator and firm (Laffont
and Tirole, 1993; Spulber, 1989).
Gal-Or (1993) is a recent paper which uses contracting theory to analyze the agency
32relationship between an insurer and provider. She shows that the optimal contract will be a
combination of a fixed rate and a share of costs. Further, the levels of the fixed rate and cost
share will vary with the reported severity of a case. In order to induce truthful reporting of
severity by providers it is necessary that the fixed rate be a non-increasing function of reported
severity and that the cost share be a non-decreasing function of severity. Insurers' objective
functions are a weighted sum of consumers' and providers' surpluses. When consumers' welfare
is more important the provider will optimally be reimbursed a larger share of costs, and vice
versa. If cost sharing is not employed (e.g., capitation reimbursement), the threat of losses from
malpractice can improve outcomes, but will in general be inferior to a combination of cost
sharing and a fixed rate. Competition in the insurance and provider markets is not modeled
explicitly.
Considering the agency problem between physicians and insurers in a market equilibrium
model may lead to important results. Consider contracting between physicians and insurers in
markets with multiple insurers. Suppose there exists an optimal contract between an insurer and
a physician. Will this optimal contract be offered by insurers? If there are many insurers,
competition for physicians may force insurers to offer more generous contracts which are non-
optimal. This will be tempered by competition in the insurance market itself, as well as by
competition in the market for physician services. There should be important differences across
medical specialties. Presumably markets for general practitioners are more competitive than the
markets for the services of pediatric oncologists. Analyzing this problem and providing
scenarios under which optimal contracts will be written and under which they won't is an
important agenda for research in this market. Further, empirical research can help todetermine
33whether these hypotheses are correct. In markets with many insurers, such as California, has
competition forced efficient contracting, or led to inefficiency? Another issue associated with
multiple insurers is physician response to each payer when there are multiple payers. Obviously
relative prices across payers matter (see McGuire and Pauly, 1991).
However, there is an additional issue associated with optimal contracting with multiple
insurers. Many insurers report that physician response to incentives is weak or nonexistent
because they don't command a large enough proportion of the physician's caseload. What this
may suggest is that as the diversity of insurance plans in a physician's patient population
increases, the cost to the physician of determining each patient's insurer and the incentives in
that contract prior to diagnosis or treatment may be too high. Given the tremendous advances
in information technology, it seems hard to believe that these information costs are particularly
large for any computerized physician's office. Further, it should be the practices with the
largest, most diverse (in terms of insurance contracts) patient populations for which
computerization is most useful, if the incentives in insurers' contracts are strong enough to be
important. I know of no research on this topic, theoretical or empirical. Since the evidence is
anecdotal, some careful systematic empirical research is necessary to first establish whether there
is convincing evidence of the existence of this phenomenon.If this phenomenon exists,
theoretical explorations into the form of optimal contracts in this situation would be useful.
The approach taken by Ellis and McGuire (1990) strikes me as the right one, however.
Ellis and McGuire consider all the relevant exchanges, between consumer and insurer, consumer
and physician, and physician and insurer. The "true" market is a market for contingent claims
(Arrow, 1963), and these exchanges are components of that market.43 Thus agency relations
34in all these exchanges have to be considered simultaneously in order to determine the optimal
contract. A complete theory should thus model agency m all of these exchanges and equilibrium
in the physician services and insurance markets. This is undoubtedly a difficult problem, but
may very well yield important new insights. Considering dynamic aspects of the relationship
between physicians and insurers may also be important. Insurers presumably learn about
physician behavior over time. They also observe the behavior of other physicians. Trigger
strategies may be available which would punish a physician when some aspect(s) of his claims
deviate by too much from some standard. The "double agency" problem proposed by Blomqvist
could be considered as a problem of common agency (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986).
Certainly there are strategic aspects to the problem as well. Groups of physicians may
contract with insurers collectively as a way to increase market power. This case of provider
organized PPOs (preferred provider organizations) has been extensively discussed (see Leffler,
1983; Dranove, Satterthwaite, and Sindelar, 1986; Frech, 1986). Leffler (1983) discusses a case
in which such a contract can be anticompetitive in the context of the Maricopa case in which
physicians agreed to a price ceiling. Greaney and Sindelar (1987) discuss how such contracts
may provide opportunities for anticompetitive behavior. Vistnes (1992) formallymodels such
contracts using the concept of network goods. He finds that these associations can increase the
market power of the firms in them. Pauly (1988) considers the effects of insurer market power
on the medical care market. He shows that insurers with market power can enforce prices to
providers which are welfare reducing. This is true for both private and public insurers.
It seems as if a tightening of the demand constraint in the insurance market has prompted
the growth of institutions designed to correct physician-insurer agency problems. There has been
35a tremendous amount of change in the institutions in this area over the last few years, so that
relations between physicians and insurers have changed in a very fundamental way. Prepaid
health plans have been increasing, and traditional reimbursement insurance is on the wane.
While at one time, almost all prepaid health plans integrated the insurance and production of
health services functions, that is no longer true. The dominant model is now one in which
health plans contract with physicians or groups of physicians for services. Most physicians
contract with multiple health plans and treat patients with reimbursement insurance. Further,
the President's plan for health care reform calls for the fonnation of large health plans which
contract with physicians for services.
Nonetheless, at this point very little is known about the contracting between physicians
and health plans. The rapid change and tremendous variation in the institutions should offer
excellent opportunities for empirical work on the economics of contracting. Why have health
plans by and large stopped "making" physician services and "buying" them? What forms of
contract are written between health plans and physician firms, and under what circumstances?
Are there strategic aspects to this contracting? An interesting question is what the role of entry
is in the insurance market. If physicians divide their activities between many insurers does it
make it more difficult for insurers to gather information about physicians? Does this make
physicians less responsive to any one insurer's incentives? Does entry reduce the ability of any
one insurer to punish physicians? Unfortunately, the reason we know so little is that at present
there are no readily available data sets on the existence or form of these contracts. I think that
here some data gathering is called for. Given the tremendous data requirements of insurers,
much of this information should be available in their own internal databases. Obtaining access
36to such databases may not be easy, but should be possible.
4.3 Agency Problems within the Physician Firm
At present, over 50%ofAmerican physicians actively engaged in patient care are
members of medical group practices. Further, that proportion has been growing over time. The
vast bulk of models of the physician firm suppose that it consists of a single physician
entrepreneur. Agency problems exist within any organization (Holmstrom, 1982), thus the
behavior of physicians in groups will differ from that of the single entrepreneur. Consequently,
models which ignore the internal structure of the physician firm may not accurately represent
behavior.
Further, physician (and other professional) finns differ in a fundamental way from most
other firms, however, in that the important capital is human, not physical. This has several
implication. First, risks to human capital can not generally be diversified through the market.
This suggests that the structure of these organizations may be determined in part by the desire
to diversify risks to physicians' human capital.Gaynor and Gertler (1993) show that
compensation contracts within physician groups trade off moral hazard for risk spreading.
Physicians in more risk averse groups adopt compensation contracts with more revenue sharing,
such that the most risk averse sacrifice approximately 10 percent in income relative to the least
risk averse.
Second, reputation, both firm and physician-specific, is potentially very important in this
market. This has been discussed in a few papers. Getzen (1984) argues that groups are optimal
institutional responses to the importance of reputation in the market, due to what he terms
37"reputational economies of scale'. It is not clear exactly what is meant by this term in an
operative sense. It might mean economies of scale in the technology of monitoring, say, but that
would only explain larger versus smaller groups, not group versus solo practice. Gaynor and
Salant (1993) show that efficient outcomes are harder to sustain in groups when reputation is
important. Reputation is modelled as an investment determined by lagged collective group
effort. This simply increases the possibilities for free-riding and thus makes cooperation more
difficult to implement. They do not consider monitoring, however. The difference in the results
between Gaynor and Salant and Getzen is due to modelling different aspects of reputation. The
truth may lie somewhere in between. Groups likely exist for reasons other than reputation, but
reputation may play an important role in determining group size and structure. Most of the
recent growth in physician groups is in small and large groups (Marder and Zuckerman, 1989).
This could be due to the technology of monitoring. In small groups, monitoring is informal and
inexpensive. If there are fixed costs to monitoring (e.g., cost of a manager, information system,
etc.), then there may be a critical group size necessary to cover these fixed costs. Thus, small
groups and groups of at least the critical size would be the most viable.
Finally, the importance of reputation and the interaction of firm-specific and individual-
specific human capital creates the possibility of potentially severe hold-up problems. Groups
want physicians to invest in firm specific human capital. A large part of this is investing in
reputation. New physicians invest in reputations. While they are investing, their earnings are
relatively low if they rely solely on their own reputation. Thus group practices or HMOs are
attractive, since there are firm reputations which have some public good aspects to them for
those who work there. A group practice will share its reputation with a new physician but must
38provide the new physician with incentives to invest in the group's reputation. The firm has to
credibly demonstrate they won't exploit the new physician. Groups typically have a waiting
period of 2 to 4 years before a new physician can be considered for ownership. This is similar
to an associate position in a law firm. As has been shown elsewhere (Malcolmson, 1984; Gilson
and Mnookin, 1989) up-or-out contracts are an incentive-compatible means of inducing junior
members of the group to post a performance bond in the form of compensation deferred until
after being admitted to ownership. The firm commits not to hold-up the juror member by
making promotion at a fixed point in time necessary to remain in the firm. However, it is not
clear that the time period is long enough, or that enough junior members are denied promotion
for this arrangement to be effective. Alternatively, investments in human capital may be more
general than firm-specific, and occur prior to employment (internships and residences),
consequently investments in firm-specific human capital may not be particularly important in
medicine.
The flip side of the problem occurs for the group when the new physician is established.
The physician's reputation is now much more specific to him than to the firm, so the firm must
devise a way to keep him from leaving and moving to solo practice. It seems that it is crucial
that the firm own the rights to the patient lists of all the physicians in the group (see Grossman
and Hart, 1986), i.e., the physician is not entitled to take his patients with him if he leaves. The
issue seems less critical for HMOs, because consumers are tied to the physicians employed by
the HMO, thus a physician can not practically take his patients with him if he leaves.It seems
as if monitoring could solve the firm's problem of getting physicians tobehave as desired and
eliminate the potential for exploitation, but it wouldn't solve the problem of physicians leaving
39and taking their patients with them when they become established.There may be a
compensation contract which could solve this problem, however. Let physicians' shares increase
with their reputations (roughly, with time). The group need only pay them what they could earn
on their own minus the value of the advantages of being in the group (sharing fixed costs, risk
spreading, smoothing work schedules, the value of the group's reputation). I think this implies
that shares should increase with age and perhaps that specialists should have greater shares than
GPs (although internal transfer pricing for referrals could affect this). If there is no holdup
problem in HMOs, then there is no reason that HMOcompensationcontracts should look like
those for medical group practices. The optimal fonns of contracts when there is a potential
hold-up problem have been studied extensively (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993; Rogerson,
1992; Grossman and Hart 1986). The form of the efficient contract hinges on the nature of
relationship-specific investment among the parties, among other factors. Extension of these
models to cover the institutional details of medical group practices and econometric testing of
the resulting hypotheses may be a good way to empirically test the implications of these theories.
This may also be a fertile laboratory for empirical analysis of other issues in the
economics of the firm. Medical group practices are typically relatively simple organizations.
They tend to be very horizontal in structure, and not particularly large relative to corporations.
In a typical medical group practice there is some sharing of revenues and costs. In addition,
decisions about pricing and the hiring of inputs are made collectively (Held and Reinhardt, 1979;
Kralewskii. 1985). There also may be internal referrals among doctors within the group.
Thus an individual's actions affects the collectivity through the profit-sharing scheme and
possibly through referrals. The collectivity affects the individual through pricing and input
40decisions. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of variation in the internal organization of these
finns. Some share income equally, some allocate it on a pure productivity basis, some are small
and some are large, some have extensive internal controls and monitoring, some have none,
some have a hierarchical structure while others are completely horizontal. Some research has
been done on the economics of these organizations.
Gaynor (1989) specifies and tests a theory of competition within the firm. He shows that
pure productivity compensation may lead toexcessive competition within the firm if physicians
compete with each other over patients. It has been shown that physicians respond tofinancial
incentives (Hillman, Pauly, and Kerstein, 1989; Gaynor and Pauly, 1990), compensation
contracts trade off incentives for risk spreading (Gaynor and Gertler, 1993), and internal controls
are adopted to reduce opportunism (Lee, 1990). Gaynor and Salant (1993) show that optimal
payoffs in a group with overlapping generations of members may involve payingolder members
more, even though their productivity is lower than youngermembers. This is necessary in order
to provide younger workers with an incentive to provide optimal effort and to punishthose who
don't. Nonetheless, data on medical group practices could be used to address many moreissues
in the economics of organizations, such as the adoption of monitoring versusincentives,
hierarchical versus horizontal structures. Further, alternative modelling approachescould be
employed, such as taking account of the repeated interactions of physiciansin the group (Gaynor
and Salant, 1993). These may yield testably different implications than previoustheoretical
analyses.
415. Summary,Recommendations for Future Research, and Policy Implications
5.1 Summary
This paper has reviewed the literature and considered current issues in the market for
physician services. What is bought and sold is not only a service, but advice on which service
to use and how much of it to buy. Given that, agency issues are clearly paramount. Games of
persuasion seem the natural tool for modelling physician-patient interactions. In particular,
Wolinsky (1993) has modelled such a game in a market equilibrium context. However, there
is not convincing empirical evidence that a great deal of successful persuasion by physicians is
occurring, in the sense of patients purchasing more than is optimal, given the prices they face
under insurance.
Since patients do not pay for most of what they consume, the more relevant relationship
may be between the insurer and physician. Existing models which consider optimal insurer
payments to physicians do not incorporate asymmetric information between the insurer and
physician, nor do they consider market equilibrium. A complete model would consider all the
exchanges which comprise a market for contingent claims. This involves agency relations
between consumers and insurers, patients and physicians, and physicians and insurers. Which
forms of contracts emerge will depend on competition in all of these markets. For example, if
the market for insurance is very competitive, this could force insurers to write contracts with
physicians which optimally constrain their opportunistic behavior. Alternatively, if there are
relatively few physicians, then efficient contracts with physicians might not emerge even in
competitive insurance markets.
Agency problems are also present within physician firms. The importance of human
42capital and reputation may make these problems more pervasive than in other markets. Since
risks to human capital cannot be diversified through the market, one function of the physician
firm is to spread this risk. Medical groups also face potentially severe holdup problems because
of the importance of human capital and reputation. In addition, since medical groups are
particularly simple firms, they provide a fertile ground for testing hypotheses from theories of
the firm.
5.2Recommendationsfor Future Research
It is clear that the most relevant issues in the market for physician services revolve
around information and agency. I see future research in the following areas as being particularly
interesting and useful.
1) Modelling the joint agency problems of the patient with the physician and the insurer with the
physician. This is a fascinating and difficult problem, and will undoubtedly take considerable
ingenuity,
2) Modelling the contracting between health plans and physicians, particularly examining
strategic considerations on the part of both physicians and health plans,
3) Data gathering and empirical research on contracting between health plans and insurers. This
is an area in which virtually nothing is known, but these contracts seem as if they will come to
characterize the structure of this market. Further, data on these contracts and the behavior of
physicians may provide excellent opportunities to test hypotheses regarding the internal
organization of the firm,
4) Empirical research on the internal organization of medical group practices. The market for
43physician services cannot be analyzed without taking account of the presence ofmedical group
practices, and their internal organization has striking effects on the behaviorof their members.
Again, empirical examination of these simple firms may be a particularly fertile groundin which
to examine hypotheses on the economics of the firm.
5.3 Policy Implications
Unlike markets traditionally studied by industrial organization economists, market failure
in the physician services market derives not from anticompetitive behavior, but from the
structure of information between buyers and sellers. The implications of this paper are that
agency problems between insurers and physicians are likely to havethe most impact on the
market. After long decades of quietude, health insurers are actively trying to control physicians'
behavior. PPOs seek out price discounts, HMOs and IPAs utilize financial incentives, and most
health plans utilize various controls such as prior authorization for procedures, utilization
review, etc., which are collectively referred to as "managed care." Research on optimal
contracting between insurers and physicians could provide a very useful input into this process.
The Clinton health care reform proposal is built around the notion of "managed
competition," in which health insurance purchasing cooperatives ("Health Alliances") contract
with private health insurers. Consumers will be offered a fmancial incentive to choose health
plans (HMOs, IPAs) rather than fee-for-service insurers, although each Health Alliance must
offer at least one fee-for-service option. Premiums will be capped at a maximum for a basic set
of benefits. Health plans will be required to report uniform information on utilization, costs,
and health outcomes to the Health Alliances, which will be available to consumers to compare
44the various health plans. President Clinton has proposed price controls if the rate of health care
cost inflation has not fallen to the rate of increase in the CPI by a certain date.
At this juncture managed competition appears to be envisioned as embodied in health
plans utilizing capitation contracts on salaries combined with managed care controls. Physicians
would be allowed to contract with any number of health plans, although the Congressional
Budget Office is considering advising that physicians be restricted to contracting with a single
health plan. As reviewed in Section 4.2, pure capitation, or fixed contracts, are never optimal.
Further, not only is it far from clear whether restricting contracting is welfare improving or
decreasing, the welfare optimal prescription will likely be different across specialties and across
geographic markets within the same specialty. The premium cap could have the impact of
forcing insurers to adopt methods to constrain physicians' behavior, although it is not clear that
insurers are not under competitive pressure to do so currently. Price controls, if enacted, could
have very undesirable impacts. As Glazer and McGuire (1993) point out, restricting physicians'
abilities to set fees may lead to welfare reducing decreases in quality. Further, government is
faced with the same asymmetric information problem in controlling physicians that insurers are.
It is not clear that there are gains from direct public involvement.
A widely proposed alternative to the Clinton Administration's managed competition
scenario is a "single payer" system, in which the insurance market is supplanted by a single
payer, either the govermnent or a large private insurer, as in Canada. As discussed in Section
4.2, this type of scheme may have merits if competition in the insurance market causes efficient
contracts to fail to be offered, or if the information costs to physicians of processing multiple
insurers' incentives are too high. A single payer system will not result in efficiency gains if
45competition forces insurers to be efficient. Research on the relations between insurers and
physicians in local markets with differing structures would be very useful in informing the policy
debate on this issue.
Last, regardless of the system, it is important to remember that government is faced with
the same asymmetric information problem in controlling physicians that private insurers are.
Unless there is some advantage on the part of government in collecting information, or unless
competition in the insurance market causes contractual failure, it is not clear that the market
failures discussed in this paper are pareto-relevant, that is, that actions taken by a party(ies)
external to the market will result in an increase in social welfare. The rate of increase in
Federal expenditures on physician services (129%) relative to private physician expenditures
(105%) over the last decade (1980-1990) does not seem to indicate any special advantage on the
part of the federal government in addressing these issues.45
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1. These are in 1990 dollars. Adjustments were made using the all-items CPI.
2.Note that the categories are not mutually exclusive.
3. Starr (1982) traces the history of the process by which physicians eliminated or greatly
curtailed competition from other kinds of health care practitioners. Shaked and Sutton (1981)
show that granting monopolistic power to self-regulating is likely to be welfare reducing, and
allowing entry of rival para-professions will definitely increase social welfare. Interestingly
enough, recent evidence indicates that consumers are once again spending a significant amount
on non-physician health care providers (Eisenberg et al., 1993). 1 am restricting my attention
purely to the market for physician services.
4. There was some trenchant criticism of Friedman and Kuznets's calculations at the time. See
Lewis (1963) and Hansen (1964).
5. It seems hard to believe that there are barriers to entry to medicine which effectively raise
the incomes of physicians generally. Indeed, admission rates to medical schools increased over
the decade of the 1 980s, indicating, if anything, that barriers were lower. Where there may be
effective barriers to entry are into some of the specialties, where the specialty societies seem to
have effectively limited the number of medical school graduates admitted to residencies.
6. It is also possible that these were markets in disequilibrium, with supply lagging behind
increases in demand.
7. This may not be true if information about prices is costly to obtain. Consumers may choose
(optimally) to search very little, thereby bestowing market power upon the physician as seller.
See Phelps (1992, pp. 193-204), Newhouse and Sloan (1972), Cantwell (1981), Marquis (1985),
Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981), White-Means (1989), Haas-Wilson (1990), and Gaynor and
Polachek (1994) for empirical evidence on this topic.I will discuss consumer search,
particularly as the presence of insurance bears upon it, more extensively in Section 3.1.3.
8. The links between the market for medical education, the market for physicians, and the
market for physician services are not made explicit.
9. For some other examinations of price discrimination see Ruffm and Leigh (1973), Masson
and Wu (1974), Hoerger (1989), and Lachs, Sindelar, and Horwitz (1990). Ruffin and Leigh
find charity as motivation for price discrimination to be consistent with their data. Lachs,
Sindelar, and Horwitz do not. Hoerger finds empirical evidence of price discrimination between
new and established patients consistent with the profit maximizing exercise of market power.
10. Prior to 1975 there seemed to be an implicit antitrust exemption for the learned professions.
There was very little application of antitrust principles to the profession of medicine, or to other
professions.
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11. This is not to imply that anticompetitive or collusive behavior by physicians or physicians
and hospitals is not of concern (see Horoschak, 1992).
12. Nitzan and Tsur (1989) show that professional codes of ethics which ban advertising can
actually improve quality and may increase or decrease welfare. McGuire (1983) shows that if
patients judge physicians purely by experience, then all physicians will gain by the suppression
of information, regardless of whether they are high quality or incompetent.
13. These papers differ in the data used, the presence of controls for quality, and econometric
methods.
14. There were two groups of consumers in this study: Medicare beneficiaries and state
employees, both of whom have very generous insurance coverage.
15. An alternative is that this is a byproduct of government regulation. In 1983 Medicare
adopted a method of paying for hospital services via a system of fixed (roughly) prices for
diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), the Prospective Payment System (PPS). In the aftermath
of this change in reimbursement policy, many services which had previously been produced on
an inpatient basis were now produced in outpatient settings. This may have led to windfall rents
for physicians.
16. I only consider here moral hazard, i.e., what Arrow (1985) terms "hidden actions," not
adverse selection, or "hidden types."
17. Arrow (1963) is probably the first to discuss the health care market in this way. See also
Dranove and White (1987).
18. I will take the relationship between the insurer and the insured as given.
19. Marder and Thran report that the percentage of nonfederal patient care physicians in non-
solo settings stood at 61.5 percent in 1988, and had grown from 54.4 percent in 1982.
20. These problems are essentially those encountered in all professional firms, e.g., law,
accounting, consulting, architecture, not just in medicine.
21. Strictly speaking, this is true of tangible products as well. Steel of a certain grade produced
at the same foundry varies between runs. No two cars are identical, even if they are produced
on the same assembly line by the same workers. Even simple tap water varies in its
composition. This is simply the nature of the physical world. Regardless, it is commonly
agreed that services are inherently more heterogeneous than manufactured or mined goods.
22. It would probably be more accurate to say that it is preference heterogeneity which is
critical, since this should call forth heterogeneity in production by producers. This is especially
likely to be true for services, since the cost of altering the product to suit the customer (e.g.,
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a barber chatting more with his garrulous customers and less with his laconic ones) is likely to
be low.
23. Over 88 percent of all physicians were located in metropolitan areas in 1989 (Robacketal.,
1990).
24. There are undoubtedly some patients who self-diagnose, but there are very few physicians
who will simply respond to a request for treatment without any diagnosis. Further, there are
some services, such as a check-up or physical, which are not preceded by a diagnosis, but their
purpose is o provide information for diagnosis and advice. In any event, such services
constitute a minority of a physician's practice.
25. Satterthwaite (1979, 1985) and Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981) document this behavior.
26. Hoerger (1990) documents this.He also presents evidence consistent with price
discrimination between new and established patients.
27. Satterthwaite (1979), Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981), Satterthwaite (1985), and Dranove and
Satterthwaite (1992) have extensively explored the effects of this type of uncertainty on
equilibrium in this market.
28, Telser (1978, Chapter 8) explores equilibrium price distributions in markets where both
buyers and sellers and imperfectly informed.
29. The evidence from Hibbard and Weeks is consistent with this conjecture.
30. He assumes a homogeneous product.It is not clear what impact introducing product
heterogeneity might have on the results. The papers which consider patient search with a
heterogeneous product, e.g., Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992), do not consider the effects of
insurance.
31. Nonetheless, the evidence from McCarthy (1985) indicates that demand is quite elastic.
32. See e.g., Darby and Kami (1972), Milgrom (1981), Wolinsky (1993), Plott and Wilde
(1980), Crawford and Sobel (1980), Pitchik and Schotter (1987), Green and Stokey (1981),
Nitzan and Tsur (1991) generally, and Pauly (1980), Dranove (1988), and Glazer and McGuire
(1991) for discussions of this in health care.
33. A recent paper by Frank, Ma, McGuire, and Salkever (1993) analyzes the case where the
accuracy of the diagnosis is increasing in physician effort. Physician effort is noncontractible,
and this noncontractibility causes physicians to shirk and undersupply effort.
34. See Sloan and Feldman (1978) and Feldman and Sloan (1988) for reviews of this material.
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35. See McGuire and Pauly (1991) for a trenchant criticism of the target income model. They
point out that the target income model is simply a standard model in which income effects are
extremely strong.
36. Arrow (1963) discusses the role that professional ethics play in limiting opportunistic
behavior by physicians.
37. There are of course many other important models of the physician-patient relationship. I
confine myself, however, to those which explicitly consider the agency aspects of that
relationship. Agency problems between physicians and insurers/payers are considered in the
next section.
38. Dranove discusses issues such as entry and consumer search in Section VI.
39. Glazer and McGuire (1991) is a closely related paper which considers the question of
appropriate referrals in such markets.
40. There is some insurance in some other markets, e.g., autobody repair, but it is by no means
as dominant as in health care.
41. If insurers earn zero profits, then this corresponds to social costs.
42. Some papers have examined physician response to insurance companies' reimbursement
policies (Sloan, 1982, Lee, 1989).
43.In this sense the analysis should not be confined to physicians, but all sellers of health
care services from whom consumer might purchase when an event of illness occurs.
44. These findings are corroborated by Gordon and Lang (1993) for legal firms.
45.These rates are unadjusted for differential composition, e.g., age, or compositional ages,
changes, e.g., the large increases in Medicaid enrollments in the 1980s.
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59Table 1: Nonfederal Patient Care Physicians and Physician/Population Ratio
United States, Selected Years 1965 -1992
PhysiciansAverage Annual
Nonfederal Average Annual per 100,000 Growth in
Patient Growth in Civilian Physician-
Year Care Physicians Physicians PopulationPopulation Ratio
1965 237482 124
1970 252778 1.26% 125 0.16%
1975 285345 2.45% 135 1.55%
1980 358470 4.67% 159 333%
1981 370096 3.24% 162 1.89%
1982 389468 5.23% 169 432%
1983 403956 3.72% 174 2.96%
1984 416809 3.18% 178 230%
1985 426721 2.38% 180 1.12%
1986 439580 3.01% 184 2.22%
1987 455729 3.67% 189 2.72%
1989 471692 1.74% 193 1.05%
1990 487796 3.41% 198 2.59%
1992 520216 3.27% 204 1.50%
Source: American Medical Association, Physician Characteristics and Distribution in the
United States. various years.Table 2: Number of Nonfederal Physicians and Physicians per Capita
for the 20 most populous MSAs, 1988
Number ofPhysicians
Rank Metropolitan Statistical Area Physiciansper Capita
1 Los Angeles, CA 20359 2.37
2 New York, NY 27839 3.25
3 Chicago, IL 15279 2.46
4 Philadelphia, PA-NJ 12465 2.53
5 Detroit,MI 7989 1.84
6 Washington, DC-MD-VA 10172 2.72
7 Boston, MA 11346 3.43
8 Houston, TX 6747 2.08
9 Atlanta, GA 4963 1.81
10 Nassau-Suffolk, NY 7772 2.95
11 St. Louis, MO-IL 5265 2.12
12 Dallas, TX 4564 1.84
13 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 4964 2.08
14 San Diego, CA 4755 2.01
15 Baltimore, MD 6624 2.83
16 Riverside-San Bernadino, CA 3190 1.4
17 Anaheim-Santa Ana, CA 5121 2.27
18 Pittsburg, PA 5275 2.52
19 Phoenix, AZ 3722 1.83
20 Oakland, CA 4253 2.12Table 3: Number of Nonfederal Physicians and Physicians per Capita in Metropolitan Statistical
Areas with Populations over 1 Million
Average Physicians per 1000 Annual Growth in
Number of Physicians Persons Physicians per Capita
per MSA in MSA (populationin MSAs (population
Year (population weighted) weighted average) weighted)
1958 4870.6 1.113
1970 6774.5 1.652 3.35%
1971 6846 1.687 2.12%
1972 6810.9 1.697 0.59%
1973 6742.1 1.715 1.06%
1974 6753 1.734 1.11%
1975 6886.5 1.774 2.31%
1976 6862.2 1.791 0.96%
1977 6936.7 1.886 5.30%
1978 7029.5 1.937 2.70%
1980 7541.3 2.077 3.55%
1982 8072.6 2.193 2.75%
1983 8331.2 2.243 2.28%
1985 8586.2 2.306 1.39%
1986 8863.6 2.359 2.30%
1988 9125.2 2.383 0.51%
Source: American Medical AssociationTable 4: Number of Medical School Applicants and Application/Admission Ratio,









1970-71 24987 148797 2.17
1971-72 29172 210943 2.36
1972-73 36135 267306 2.63
1973-74 40506 328275 2.83
1974-75 42624 362376 2.83
1975-76 42303 366040 2.75
1976-77 42155 372282 2.67
1977-78 40569 371545 2.54
1978-79 36636 335982 2.22
1979-80 36141 335217 2.14
1980-81 36100 330888 2.11
1981-82 36727 339975 2.12
1982-83 35730 334897 2.07
1983-84 35200 319340 2.05
1984-85 35944 331937 2.09
1985-86 32893 307427 1.91
1986-87 31323 295744 1.83
1987-88 28123 266900 1.65
1988-89 26721 258442 1.56
1989-90 26915 262426 1.59
1990-91 29243 290489 1.70
1991-92 33301 354017 1.91
1992-93 37410 405720 2.14
...ource: Medical School Admissions Requirements, Association or American Medical Colleges.
As presented in the Journal of the American Medical Association, various years.Table 5: Number of Medical Schools, Enrollment, and Graduates
United States, 1970 -1993





1970-71 103 11348 8974
1971-72 108 12361 9551
1972-73 112 13726 10391
1973-74 114 14185 11613
1974-75 114 14963 12714
1975-76 114 15351 13561
1976-77 116 15667 13607
1977-78 122 16134 14393
1978-79 125 16620 14966
1979-80 126 17014 15135
1980-81 126 17204 15667
1981-82 126 17320 15985
1982-83 127 17230 15824
1983-84 127 17175 16327
1984-85 127 16992 16319
1985-86 127 16929 16125
1986-87 127 16779 15836
1987-88 127 16686 15887
1988-89 127 16781 15620
1989-90 127 16749 15336
1990-91 126 16803 15481
1991-92 126 17027 15386
1992-93 126 17001 15554
ource: Medical School Admissioas Requirements, Association of American Medical Colleges.
As presented in the Journal of the American Medical Association, various years.Table 6: Real Physician Income After Expenses, Before Taxes'
Average Annual Average Annual
Income Growth in Real Net



















Source: American Medical Association, Socioeconomic Characteristics of Medical Practice, 1993
'Deflated by Gross National Product deflator.Table 7: Real Physician Net Income per Hour
Year Income per Hour (In Annual Growth in











Source: American Medical Association, Socioeconomic Characteristics of Medical Practice, 1993
'In patient care activitiesTable 8: Group Physicians as a Percentage











Source:American Medical Association, Medical Groups
in the U.S.: a Survey of Practice Characteristics,



















HMO Referrals 19.8 15.4 -22.22%
PPO Contracts 55.8 69.3 24. 19%
Source: American Medical Association, Medical Groups in the U. S.: A Survey of Practice
Characteristics, 1990 & 1993.F
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